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RESTORATIVE RIGGING AND THE SAFE INDICATION ACCOUNT 
Steven Luper, Trinity University 
 
Typical Gettieresque scenarios involve a subject, say S, who uses a method, M, of 
acquiring (or sustaining) a belief, p, where, normally, M is a reliable indicator of the truth 
of p, yet, in S’s peculiar circumstances, M is not reliable.  Let us say that in such 
circumstances M has been deleteriously rigged.  Recently, epistemologists have 
discussed a different sort of scenario, involving rigging that restores the reliability of a 
method M that is deleteriously rigged.  We might say that in such scenarios M has been 
restoratively rigged.  Some theorists, including Robert Shope (2002; also Joe Salerno 
2004), have adduced cases of restorative rigging against (among others) the safe 
indication account of knowledge defended by Steven Luper (1984, 1987, 2002), Ernest 
Sosa (2002, 2003), and Timothy Williamson (2000).  Restoratively rigged cases have at 
least some of the earmarks of Gettier’s original examples.  Shope thinks that restorative 
rigging is just another layer of Gettieresque manipulation, so that examples involving 
such manipulation are Gettier cases.  He then criticizes the safe indication account on the 
grounds that it treats these examples as if they involved genuine knowledge.  But (at 
least) some restoratively rigged cases strike other epistemologists, such as Neta and 
Rohrbaugh (2004) and Juan Comesaña (2004), as examples of genuine knowledge, and 
hence not as Gettier scenarios at all.  These theorists also criticize the safe indication 
account—this time because cases of restorative rigging are really examples of knowledge 
but cannot meet the central condition of the safe indication account, which is roughly 
that, at time t, S knows p by arriving at the belief p through some method M only if: 
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T: M would, at t, indicate that p was true only if p were true. 
If I have understood them, it cannot be that both groups of critics are correct 
(about whether restoratively rigged cases are Gettieresque).  But both can be mistaken 
(about whether these cases are counterexamples to the safe indication account).  I will 
argue, as against Shope and like-minded critics, that (1) restorative rigging is not a form 
of Gettierizing; restorative rigging can enable us to know things.  Against Neta and 
Rohrbaugh, and similar critics, I will argue that (2) restorative rigging does not bar a case 
from meeting the safe indication condition T.  So neither group of critics has provided 
grounds for rejecting the safe indication account after all.  I begin with (1).   
 
The initial plausibility of (1) will seem clear to epistemologists who adopt the widely 
accepted externalist view that my knowing p via some method M requires that M be 
reliable in my circumstances.  For, as we have observed, a method’s reliability can be 
impaired by one set of factors yet restored by another.  If M’s reliability can be ensured 
by restorative rigging, and knowing p via M hinges on M’s reliability in my 
circumstances, then restorative rigging can be the critical factor in whether I know p via 
M.  It can enable us to meet a condition that is necessary for knowledge. 
 By appealing to examples, we can bring out the acceptability of the implications 
of (1).  Let us assume that the following is a straightforward case of knowledge: 
1—Ordinary Barn Case.  S stands before a barn and forms a visual impression of 
it in optimal viewing conditions, coming thereby to believe a barn is there.  S’s 
belief is not based on any explicit reasoning.  S does not, for example, appeal to 
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other beliefs in coming to S’s view.  In fact, S has little or no idea about how 
vision works. 
Let us also assume that the following familiar case (from Alvin Goldman 1976) is an 
example of ignorance (it involves deleterious rigging): 
2—Barn Case with Deleterious Rigging.  S stands before the only real barn in a 
neighborhood that, unbeknownst to S, is filled with convincing papier-mâché 
look-alikes.  S has not seen the copies; instead, as in the Ordinary Barn Case, S 
forms a visual impression of the real barn and in that way, using no explicit 
reasoning, believes that a barn is there. 
To this case we might add one detail:  S never will see one of the copies, due perhaps to 
S’s preoccupation with pressing tasks and the route S takes out of the neighborhood.  
Hence S’s seeing a facsimile is, as things turn out, a wholly counterfactual possibility.  
Clearly this detail changes nothing as to S’s possessing knowledge:  no one would say 
that, while looking at the real barn, S knows it is there so long as S never actually sees 
any of the fakes but otherwise S does not.  One can imagine many additional situations in 
which the reliability of a method is undermined by close yet counterfactual possibilities, 
precluding the transmission of knowledge.  
But now consider a third case.   
3—Case with Restorative Rigging.  This is just like 2 except that, during this time 
of year, X-smog (as we might call it) always fills the part of the world S occupies.  
X-smog has a peculiarity:  in a completely reliable way, it conceals all papier-
mâché barns but no real barns, thus stopping any fake barns from causing in S 
barn-type visual percepts which the fakes might otherwise have produced.   
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I suggest that, in this third case, as in the first, S knows a barn is there.  Given the 
circumstances portrayed in the second—deleteriously rigged—case, visual impressions of 
barns are unreliable indicators that barns are present, since such impressions might be 
produced by fake barns.  This is why the second case clearly involves knowledge failure.  
But in our latest example the reliability of barn percepts (as indicators of the presence of 
barns) has been restored—it is false, given the circumstances, that barn percepts might 
have been caused by fake barns, and true that they would only be caused by real barns. 
Hence there is no failure of knowledge in our third case. (The suggestion that there is no 
failure of knowledge in the third example can be reinforced if we notice that, in a great 
many straightforward cases of knowledge—cases that do not seem Gettieresque—there is 
restorative ‘rigging.’  That is, in many quite straightforward cases, while there are factors 
that tend to undermine the reliability of belief formation methods, other factors 
counteract the first.) 
Using the Stalnaker-Lewis (1968, 1973) semantics for subjunctive conditionals 
(supplemented with Robert Nozick’s gloss in 1981, p. 174, note 8) we can put the point 
this way:  the nearest worlds in which S is deceived by barn simulacra are significantly 
farther from the actual world as it is portrayed in scenario 3 than they are in the actual 
world as it is portrayed in scenario 2.  Figuratively speaking, the deleterious rigging in 2 
‘pulls’ worlds in which S is deceived closer in than they are in scenario 1, while the 
restorative rigging ‘pushes’ them back out, although the restorative rigging does not 
‘push’ them as far out as they are in 1.  Still, they are far enough:  there is knowledge 
failure in neither 1 nor 3. 
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In case 3, the restorative rigging was contemporaneous with the deleterious 
rigging.  But knowledge is possible even in cases in which the former occurs after the 
latter.  For example, the description of our first case could easily be expanded as follows 
without changing our intuition that in it S knows a barn is there: 
4—Case with Noncontemporaneous Restorative Rigging.  An artist is about to 
implement a plan to spread papier-mâché barns throughout the neighborhood in 
which S will later walk.  The fakes are loaded in a truck, ready to go.  But the 
artist has several friends who think such projects are absurd, and convince him to 
change his mind.  So no fakes are in the neighborhood.  It is still later that S enters 
the area, stands before a barn, and forms a visual impression of it in optimal 
viewing conditions, coming thereby to believe a barn is there. 
The artist’s preparations constitute a factor that, while in place, tends to undermine the 
reliability of S’s method, by raising the likelihood of S’s exposure to barn duplicates.  
But the friends’ determination to convince the artist not to make a fool of himself, and 
their success, constitute a factor that, by the time S believes there is a barn, restores the 
reliability of S’s method, by once again eliminating the prospect of S’s exposure to 
replicas.  Because of the friends’ actions, it is false that, at the relevant time, S’s barn 
percepts might have been caused by a fake barn. 
We can distinguish (a) manipulation occurring in a scenario we design from (b) 
manipulation occurring in the design of a scenario.  All of our examples so far involve 
(b), and none (a).  That is, there is no character appearing in any of our four scenarios 
who deleteriously rigged S’s belief-formation method.  Nor is there anyone who restored 
the reliability of that method.  But nothing important hinges on this distinction.  Suppose 
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that the reliability of S’s deleteriously rigged method is not restored by an impersonal 
factor in S’s situation, as the fog does in our third case, but rather its reliability is restored 
by a person or agent deliberately, as in the following example:  
5—Case with Deliberate Restorative Rigging.  This is like 2 except that a team of 
scientists has decided to ensure that S will not fall into error when S relies on 
visual impressions of barns.  The team does nothing while S examines the real 
barn, but stands ready to prevent S from forming any visual impressions of the 
fakes.  They are carefully monitoring S’s eye movements and will completely 
destroy any replica that is about to come into S’s line of vision just before S sees 
it.   
In the scenario itself there is an agent who deliberately fashions the rigging so as to 
restore the reliability of a method of belief formation.  We might say it involves 
deliberate restorative rigging.  However, in spite of the deliberate rigging, it is as much a 
case of knowledge as 3 and 4.  Given the circumstances as portrayed in 3 and 4 as well as 
5, it is false that barn percepts might have been caused by fake barns, and true that they 
would only be caused by real barns.  The only difference between this latest case and the 
other two is that in it someone is trying to make S’s method of belief formation reliable.  
Why should that prevent S from attaining knowledge?  People take all sorts of steps, 
many of which we know nothing about, to ensure that we have reliable sources of 
information about things, and much of the time they thereby enable us to know things.   
 (Conceivably, the restorative rigging of a method might be undermined by further 
deleterious rigging.  We can treat such situations as we do cases of simple deleterious 
rigging, and say they involve knowledge failure.  Too, when the restorative rigging of a 
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method is undermined by deleterious rigging, the deleterious rigging might itself be 
reversed by further restorative rigging (and so forth).  We can treat such scenarios as we 
do cases of simple restorative rigging, and say they do not involve knowledge failure.) 
 
This concludes the positive defense of my claim that restorative rigging can enable us to 
know things.  Eventually I will consider some objections, but first I will respond to 
Shope’s attempt to offer such cases as counterexamples to the safe indication account. 
Shope assumes that cases of restorative rigging involve knowledge failure.  For 
example, Shope says the following case is one of knowledge failure (2002, p. 37):   
6—Guardian Angel Case.  This is just like the Deleteriously Rigged Case except 
that “a guardian angel is present who would block the formation of a false belief 
in S that [there is a barn], were S to look toward a mere facsimile, for example, by 
blurring S’s vision or by stopping S’s sensory experience from causing S to 
believe [there is a barn].”  
Shope offers his scenario as a counterexample to Goldman’s (1976) version of 
reliabilism, but he also suggests that the safe indication account is vulnerable to examples 
involving “a mere rigging by external manipulators of a match between S’s beliefs and 
the facts (47),” and I presume that the Guardian Angel Case is just such an example. But 
Shope’s case is essentially the same as our last example—case 5.  It is a scenario that 
straightforwardly involves deliberate restorative rigging, and hence it is not a 
counterexample at all.   
 Now let us consider whether restorative rigging bars a case from meeting the safe 
indication condition T.  It is clear that, in all of our examples except for the second, 
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condition T is met.  In our scenarios, S would have the percepts that indicate the presence 
of a barn only if there were a barn.  So restorative rigging does not prevent a method 
from meeting the key condition of the safe indication account.   
Yet Neta and Rohrbaugh offer cases of restorative rigging as examples of 
knowledge that are ruled by the safe indication account to be ignorance.  Here are the 
main examples they discuss: 
(A) I am drinking a glass of water which I have just poured from the bottle.  
Standing next to me is a happy person who has just won the lottery.  Had this 
person lost the lottery, she would have maliciously polluted my water with a 
tasteless, odorless, colorless toxin.  But since she won the lottery she does no such 
thing. . . .  Now, I drink the pure, unadulterated water and judge, truly and 
knowingly, that I am drinking pure, unadulterated water.   
(B) I am participating in a psychological experiment, in which I am to report the 
number of flashes I recall being show.  Before being shown the stimuli, I consume a 
glass of liquid at the request of the experimenter.  Unbeknownst to either of us, I 
have been randomly assigned to the control group, and the glass contains ordinary 
orange juice.  Other experimental groups receive juice mixed with one of a variety 
of chemicals which hinder the functioning of memory without a detectable 
phenomenological difference.  I am shown seven flashes and judge, truly and 
knowingly, that I have been shown seven flashes. 
I think most of us will be somewhat inclined to treat A and perhaps even B as cases of 
knowledge.  That is because we tend to think A and B involve restorative rigging.  
Concerning A we see that, while my circumstances are such that I am subject to being 
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poisoned by my enemy, my usual method of detecting water is unreliable, since I cannot 
distinguish water from the poison.  (Compare Case 2, in which S is liable to see a fake 
barn.)  But we reason that, after having won the lottery, my adversary would not poison 
me; hence, in my new circumstances, it is no longer true that I might have been poisoned.  
My enemy’s new frame of mind restores the reliability of my usual method of detecting 
nontoxic water, by making it the case that my water percepts would not be caused by 
toxic water, so that, were I to believe I’m drinking water on the usual basis, I would be 
correct.  Similarly with B.  While I am subject to being given the memory altering 
chemicals, my circumstances are such that in them my memory is not reliable.  But we 
reason that the decision not to give me the tainted water restores the reliability of my 
memory, making it the case that, in my circumstances as they are after it is decided that I 
will not be given the tainted water, my judgment about the seven flashes would not be 
caused through chemical manipulation.   
 I have conceded that A and B can appear to be cases of knowledge.  But Neta and 
Rohrbaugh say that (1) A and B are clear cases of knowledge and that (2) the safe 
indication account clearly does not count them as cases of knowledge.   
As to Neta and Rohrbaugh’s first point:  what happens in A and B is borderline 
restorative rigging.  In our cases 3-5, deleterious rigging (that ‘pulls’ worlds in which S is 
deceived closer to the actual world) is neutralized by restorative rigging that ‘pushes’ the 
deceptive worlds back out.  In cases A and B, factors also (noncontemporaneously) 
neutralize deleterious rigging to some extent, but these factors do not ‘push’ the deceptive 
worlds very far from the actual world.  For this reason, whether A and B involve 
knowledge failure is no straightforward matter, and there is room for reasonable 
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disagreement.  Let us add that, even if A and B were paradigm cases of restorative 
rigging, it still would be a mistake to classify them as clear cases of knowledge, for some 
theorists say, even of clear cases of restorative rigging, that they are cases of ignorance.  
Apparently, Shope takes this view.  The most straightforward explanation of his reaction 
to case 6 is that he thinks knowledge cannot be produced through restorative rigging—
that cases involving deleterious rigging remain cases of ignorance even if restoratively 
rigged.  Hence, it would seem, there are varying intuitions about whether restorative 
rigging can produce knowledge.  
There is another way to argue that in A (and B) knowledge exists:  one might say 
that, although I cannot discriminate between pure and tainted water on the basis of taste 
(and related cues), I still know the water by its taste, since my drinking the tainted water 
is a purely counterfactual possibility, and purely counterfactual possibilities cannot stop a 
method from transmitting knowledge.  But we have already established that this claim is 
false.  In our discussion of case 2 we noted that S’s epistemic status does not hinge on S’s 
never actually seeing a simulacrum:  even though S’s seeing a fake is a counterfactual 
possibility, it is enough to undermine S’s knowledge claim.  Wholly counterfactual 
possibilities are quite capable of blocking the transmission of knowledge.  (With a little 
effort we can imagine many further ways to illustrate the point that close yet 
counterfactual possibilities can preclude the transmission of knowledge.  For example, as 
in 1, S sees a real barn in a neighborhood that is free of fakes, but hovering nearby is a 
demon who can quickly and easily create convincing fakes or sensory illusions, and who 
is thinking about whether to do so, having not yet decided.  Isn’t the close possibility that 
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the demon will act sufficient to undermine the reliability of S’s method of belief 
formation and to call S’s claim to knowledge into question?) 
As to the second claim made by Neta and Rohrbaugh:  it is not completely clear 
that A and B pass the bar for knowledge according to the safe indication condition T.  Its 
proponents have some wiggle room.  Employing T, we can explain why people might 
find any case of restorative rigging hard to classify, especially a borderline case such as A 
or B.  T can be explained as follows:  p is true in all worlds close to the actual world in 
which S’s method M indicates that p is true.  In this explanation of T, the term ‘close’ is, 
of course, imprecise.  Certainly T is met in case 1 and not in 2.  It is less clear that it is 
met in cases of restorative rigging; however, I have suggested that the deceptive worlds 
involved in restorative rigging are far enough from the actual world:  restorative rigging 
upholds knowledge.  Neta and Rohrbaugh trade on examples that are borderline cases of 
restorative rigging.  Are the deceptive worlds in Neta and Rohrbaugh’s examples close 
enough for T to be met?  How close is close enough?  The matter is not determinate.  
Hence it is not clear whether they meet T.  But this fact counts in favor of the safe 
indication account, since the examples are themselves not intuitively clear cases.   
 
I will close by responding to an objection, which is this:  none of examples 1-6 involves 
genuine knowledge, for in none of them does S have good reason for thinking that S’s 
method of belief formation is reliable since S is wholly unaware of the factors that 
determine whether S’s method of belief formation is reliable.  The presence or absence of 
rigging, whether deliberate or not, is merely part of the environment in which S operates.  
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For all S knows, factors that tend to undermine the reliability of S’s methods are not 
cancelled by factors that restore the reliability of S’s methods.   
 This is the standard objection which internalist epistemologists make against all 
of the proposals of externalist epistemologists.  Externalists suggest that we can know 
things by virtue of meeting various conditions we have no idea we meet; internalists 
(most notably Lawrence BonJour) reply that the factors that make for knowledge must be 
revealed from within the cognitive perspective of the knower, or else we will be correct 
only ‘by accident,’ and our belief will be ‘epistemically irresponsible.’  Admittedly, I 
have said nothing here to resolve this debate.  Instead, I have simply assumed that 
internalism is false, and addressed my argument to externalist-minded epistemologists.  
We all know why internalists will deny that knowledge is sustained by deliberate 
restorative rigging.  What I have argued is that externalists have no good reason to deny 
this.   
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I thank my colleagues, and Synthese’s anonymous reviewer, for helpful comments on an 
earlier version of this essay. 
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